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Is there something special about the way music communicates feelings? Theorists since
Meyer (1956) have attempted to explain how music could stimulate varied and subtle
affective experiences by violating learned expectancies, or by mimicking other forms of
social interaction. Our proposal is that music speaks to the brain in its own language;
it need not imitate any other form of communication. We review recent theoretical and
empirical literature, which suggests that all conscious processes consist of dynamic
neural events, produced by spatially dispersed processes in the physical brain. Intentional
thought and affective experience arise as dynamical aspects of neural events taking place
in multiple brain areas simultaneously. At any given moment, this content comprises a
uniﬁed “scene” that is integrated into a dynamic core through synchrony of neuronal
oscillations.We propose that (1) neurodynamic synchrony with musical stimuli gives rise to
musical qualia including tonal and temporal expectancies, and that (2) music-synchronous
responses couple into core neurodynamics, enabling music to directly modulate core
affect. Expressivemusic performance, for example, may recruit rhythm-synchronous neural
responses to support affective communication. We suggest that the dynamic relationship
between musical expression and the experience of affect presents a unique opportunity
for the study of emotional experience. This may help elucidate the neural mechanisms
underlying arousal and valence, and offer a new approach to exploring the complex
dynamics of the how and why of emotional experience.
Keywords: neurodynamics, consciousness, affect, emotion, musical expectancy, oscillation, synchrony
INTRODUCTION
Every known civilization creates unique and sophisticated musi-
cal forms to communicate affect, and humans consciously seek
out musical experiences because of the feelings they evoke. There
is widespread agreement that music induces emotional experi-
ences, and that at least some aspects of this phenomenon are
universal. But what is the nature of musical feelings and what
is the relationship between musical feelings and emotions? Over
the years, competing theories have been developed to address
these issues, and sophisticated experimental paradigms have been
devised to investigate them. However, incommensurate claims
and variable ﬁndings leave many open questions. Are affective
responses to music accidents of evolution? Is there something
special about musical communication? Can the study of emo-
tion teach us anything about the nature of music? And what,
if anything, can music teach us about the nature of emotional
experience?
Since Meyer’s (1956) pioneering work in music and emotion,
theorists have struggled to explain how music could stimulate
emotional experiences by somehow triggering basic, evolution-
arily ancient psychological processes tied to survival. Empirical
approaches have sought speciﬁc behavioral and/or physiological
responses to music (Juslin and Sloboda, 2001). One speciﬁc prob-
lem that arises is the question of how an object-directed emotion
can be evoked by music with no external referent. Another is
how a sophisticated, non-referential form of cultural expression,
learned over many years of exposure, could engender innate,
survival-related responses.
The goal of this paper is to stake out some new territory in
the debate on musical emotion. First, we will ask whether emo-
tional experiences are really “basic” (Allport, 1924; Izard, 1971),
or whether they are psychologically constructed from domain-
general processes (Barrett, 2009a). Next, we will explore the
idea that all conscious systems consist of multiple neural pro-
cesses, produced by spatially dispersed events in the physical
brain and integrated into a seamless neurodynamic whole through
synchrony of neural oscillations (Edelman, 2003). Core affect
is thought to be one primitive, domain-general aspect of the
dynamic core of consciousness (Russell, 2003) especially relevant
to emotional experience (Barrett, 2009a). Then, we will review
recent evidence that neuronal synchrony with music gives rise to
musical qualia including tonal and temporal expectancies (Large
and Jones, 1999; Lerdahl, 2001; Huron, 2005; Large, 2010a).
Finally, we will argue that music-synchronous responses couple
into the dynamic core of consciousness, directly modulating core
affect.
THEORIES OF MUSIC AND EMOTION
Music does not have obvious survival value (cf. Pinker, 1997)
and yet is able to elicit strong emotional reactions. Many
biological perspectives consider the primary function of emo-
tion as a response to behavioral demands that may require
mobilization for action; they evolved to prepare an individ-
ual to deal with situations that were signiﬁcant for survival
and reproduction (Darwin, 1872/1965; Cosmides and Tooby,
2000; Huron, 2005, 2006). Darwin (1872/1965) proposed
www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 72 | 1
Flaig and Large Musical communication of core affect
that the origin of the musical communication of emotion
was to be found in the evolutionary process of sexual selec-
tion.
Psychological approaches to musical emotions have been
heavily inﬂuenced by the theory of basic emotion. Basic
emotion theorists have sought to identify categories of emo-
tions that share distinct collections of properties such as
patterns of autonomic nervous system activity and behav-
ioral responses or action tendencies (Allport, 1924; Izard,
1971; Ekman, 1972; Panksepp, 1998). Other approaches con-
sider emotions to be constructed from more primitive pro-
cesses, including affect (Irons, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988; Rus-
sell, 2003; Barrett, 2006, 2009b; Duncan and Barrett, 2007).
Mechanisms of musically induced emotion have been explored
at great length with varying causations, interpretations, and
results.
Meyer’s (1956) approach to musical emotion has been highly
inﬂuential in part because he was the ﬁrst to seriously take into
account both philosophical works (e.g., Langer, 1951) and psy-
chological theories of emotion (cf. Dewey, 1895; MacCurdy, 1925;
Angier, 1927; Rapaport, 1950). Meyer observed that namable
emotions are – unlike music – event-directed, and that emo-
tional experiences are much more subtle than the “crude and
standardized words we use to denote them.” He also observed
that emotional responses are not innate, they are highly vari-
able, and they depend on learning and enculturation (Meyer,
1956). He therefore concluded that, for the most part, music
does not communicate genuine emotions. “That which we wish
to consider” wrote Meyer, “is that which is most vital and
essential in emotional experience, the feeling-tone accompa-
nying emotional experience, that is, the affect” (Meyer, 1956,
p.12).
Meyer was also the ﬁrst to suggest that what is now called sta-
tistical learning applies to music and determines musical feelings.
For example, a passage of tonal music leads to the feeling that
some pitches are more stable than others. More stable pitches
are felt as points of repose, and less stable pitches are felt to
point toward, or be attracted to the more stable ones (Lerdahl,
2001). Such relationships are reﬂected in naming conventions of
many musical cultures, including Western, Indian and Chinese
(Meyer, 1956). Based on the failure of earlier attempts to account
for musical communication based on vibrations, ratios of inter-
vals, and so on, he argued that feelings of stability and attraction
are learned through experience with the music of a particular
culture. Moreover, the associations of musical moods, such as
happy and sad, with major or minor harmonies, or the affective
qualities associated with ragas in North Indian tonal systems are
conventional designations, having little to do with the sound itself
(Meyer, 1956).
Finally, Meyer (1956) argued that the frustration of expectancy
is the basis for affective responses to music. He believed that
affect is aroused when an action tendency is inhibited. Music,
unlike other emotional stimuli, is not referential; it both cre-
ates and inhibits expectancies thereby providing meaningful
and relevant resolutions within itself. Music communicates
affect through violations and resolutions of learned expectan-
cies.
The latter two points were taken up by modern empiricists and
theorists, who studied musical expectancy and statistical learn-
ing in a variety of musical domains, and from various points of
view (e.g., Krumhansl, 1990; Narmour, 1990; Large and Jones,
1999; Tillmann et al., 2000; Lerdahl, 2001; Huron, 2005; Temper-
ley, 2007). Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to extend
Meyer’s expectancy theory of musical emotion is Huron’s “Sweet
Anticipation” (2006). Huron argues that a fundamental job of
the brain is to make predictions about the world, and successful
predictions are rewarded. Within tonal context, the most sta-
ble pitches are experienced as most pleasant; within a metrical
context, events that occur at expected times are more pleasur-
able. Thus, Huron argues, music is fundamentally a hedonic
experience.
Huron emphasizes that tonal and temporal expectancies in
music are learned. Musical events evoke distinctive musical qualia,
and Huron reviews the body of empirical evidence showing that
qualia such as stability and attraction (“scale degree qualia”) cor-
relate with statistical properties of music (Huron, 2006). He agrees
with Meyer that the associations of major and minor modes with
happy and sad qualia are learned associations.
In a key break from Meyer, however, Huron argues that
expectancy evokes emotions, not merely affect. He adopts a two-
process approach, which posits a fast time-scale reaction and
a slow time-scale appraisal (LeDoux, 1996). Speciﬁc emotional
responses involve primitive circuits that are conserved throughout
mammalian evolution, and function relatively independently of
cognitive circuits (LeDoux, 2000). He hypothesizes, for example,
that unexpected events in music activate the neural circuitry for
fear, leading to the feeling of surprise. He goes so far as to sug-
gest that basic survival-related responses, including ﬁght, ﬂight
and freezing, lead to the speciﬁc subjective musical experiences of
frisson, laughter, and awe, respectively.
Juslin and Vastfjall (2008), consider emotions to be affective
responses that involve subjective feelings, physiological arousal,
expressions, and action tendencies. They too, reject Meyer’s
claim that music does not induce genuine emotions, because
musical responses can display all these features. They endorse
the notion that emotions involve intentionality1; emotions are
“about” something. However, they claim that music induces
a wide range of both basic and complex emotions because
music triggers a variety of psychological mechanisms beyond
expectancy. They go on to describe how brain stem reﬂexes,
evaluative conditioning, visual imagery, episodic memory, and
emotional contagion can lead to genuine emotional responses.
Brain stem reﬂexes trigger emotional responses because acous-
tic characteristics are taken by the brain stem to signal an urgent
event. Evaluative conditioning is a special kind of classic con-
ditioning in which a stimulus without an emotional meaning,
e.g., music, is consistently paired with an emotional expe-
rience, eventually coming to trigger the emotional response.
Presumably, the learned pairing of major with happy and minor
with sad (Meyer, 1956; Huron, 2006) would be an example
of this phenomenon. Triggering of visual imagery as well as
1 We use the word intentionality to refer to any mental phenomena that have
referential content (see glossary).
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episodic memories (Janata et al., 2007) can also lead to emo-
tional experiences (Sloboda and O’Neill, 2001). In all of these
cases the emotional responses are intentional – they are about
something.
Emotional contagion, in Juslin and Vastfjall’s (2008) view, is
a process in which a listener perceives the emotional expression
of the music, and then “mimics” this expression internally, as
with other forms of interpersonal interaction like bodily ges-
tures, facial gestures, and speech (Juslin and Vastfjall, 2008). In
their conceptualization, music evokes basic emotions with dis-
tinct nonverbal expressions (Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Laird and
Strout, 2007), and this process operates similarly to emotional
contagion via facial and vocal expressions of emotion (Tomkins,
1962; Ekman, 1993). Emotional contagion is linked to activation
of the so-called mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004), and Juslin (2001) suggests that music can operate in this
way because in some sense it imitates other forms of social
interaction. Below we will offer a somewhat different view of
contagion.
If we consider the full spectrum of phenomena discussed
by Juslin and Vastfjall (2008), it seems clear that a wide range
of emotional responses can be triggered by music. However,
from a musical point of view, some of these mechanisms
are more interesting than others. Loud unexpected sounds
can frighten us, and auditory stimuli can trigger conditioned
responses. But in these examples, music serves merely as a trig-
ger. Many other kinds of stimuli can trigger such responses
equally well; they need not be musical or even auditory (e.g.,
LeDoux, 2000). Episodic memory and visual imagery likely
account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the emotional responses
people experience on a day-to-day basis (Janata et al., 2007).
Moreover, there are a many reasons to believe that music is
especially effective at eliciting episodic memories (Janata et al.,
2007; Eschrich et al., 2008). If we could understand the fun-
damental mechanisms of musical communication, this may
help us to understand why episodic memories are so effec-
tively evoked by music. Here, we take a different approach to
understanding the ability of music to elicit feelings, one that
does not treat music merely as a trigger but rather focuses
on fundamental dynamic mechanisms of affective communica-
tion.
The remainder of this article is concerned primarily with
musical expectancy and contagion, as these are mechanisms that
seem to us to be most inherently musical. Expectancies arise in
response to complex, explicitly musical structures such as tonality
and meter. Contagion is a kind of empathic resonance (Molnar-
Szakacs and Overy, 2006; Chapin et al., 2010) that enables music to
function as a type of interpersonal communication. Our approach
will be to link expectancy and contagion with the dynamics of
the physical brain. This involves addressing several basic ques-
tions. What is the nature of emotional experience: are emotions
basic, evolutionarily adapted and cross-cultural, or are emotions
constructed from more fundamental psychological ingredients?
Are musical qualia based solely on learned contingencies, or do
they arise from intrinsic neurodynamics? And what is the nature
of the relationship, such that music is able to elicit affective
experiences?
EMOTION, AFFECT, AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Inﬂuenced by Darwin’s (1872/1965) theory of pan cultural emo-
tions, Tomkins (1963) and Ekman et al. (1987) argued that
emotions are genetically determined products of evolution. Basic
emotions are discrete, and each category shares a distinctive collec-
tion of properties including patterns of autonomic nervous system
activity, behavioral responses or action tendencies, and a set of
emotion-speciﬁc brain structures that are thought tomediate these
particular “basic” emotions. Each basic emotion derives from a
particular causal mechanism; an evolutionarily preserved mod-
ule in the brain (Tomkins, 1963; Ekman, 1992; Panksepp, 1998).
Ekman (1984) proposed that thenatural boundaries between types
of emotion could be determined by differences in facial expres-
sion. Huron’s (2005) approach to musical emotion and Juslin
andVastfjall’s (2008) multiple mechanisms theory tend to endorse
the basic emotion view. Basic emotions are cross-cultural and
non-basic emotions are speciﬁc to cultural upbringing. How-
ever, there is little agreement about which emotions are basic,
how many emotions are basic, and how basic emotions are
deﬁned.
Recent behavioral, psychophysiological, and neural ﬁndings
(e.g., Barrett, 2006; Pessoa, 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012) have led a
number of emotion theorists to question the basic emotion view
(Ortony and Turner, 1990; Russell and Barrett, 1999; Duncan
and Barrett, 2007). An alternative approach holds that diverse
human emotions result from the interplay of more fundamen-
tal domain-general processes (Russell, 2003; Pessoa, 2008; Barrett,
2009b). Psychological constructionists argue that emotions are
culturally relative, learned, and, though they are a result of evo-
lution, they are not biologically basic (Russell and Barrett, 1999;
Duncan and Barrett, 2007). Emotions are the combination of psy-
chologically primitive processes that encompass both affective and
intentional components. A speciﬁc emotion is not the invariable
result of activation in a particular brain area; neural circuitry real-
izes more basic processes across emotion categories (Pessoa, 2008;
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). Meyer’s approach to the musical
communication of affect is consistent with this view.
Contemporary neurodynamic approaches hypothesize that all
conscious states are a multimodal process entailed by physical
events occurring in the brain (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Engel
and Singer, 2001; Searle, 2001; Seth et al., 2006; Pessoa, 2008).
The neural structures and mechanisms underlying consciousness
contribute domain-general processes to many psychological phe-
nomena. Importantly, when spatially distinct areas contribute to
the contents of consciousness, they enter into a uniﬁed neuro-
dynamic core (e.g., Edelman, 2003). Neurodynamic theories of
consciousness propose that the synchronous activations of the tha-
lamocortical system give rise to the unity of conscious experience
(Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Varela et al., 2001; Cosmelli et al.,
2006). Binding of spatially distinct processes is thought to occur
through enhanced synchrony in gamma and beta band rhythms
(Engel and Singer, 2001; Fujioka et al., 2012), and high frequency
activity is modulated by slower rhythms such as delta and theta
(Lakatos et al., 2005; Buzsáki, 2006; Canolty et al., 2006).
Intentionality and affect are fundamental properties of con-
scious experience (Searle, 2001). Conscious processes point to
or are about something (Brentano, 1973; Searle, 2000), and they
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possess a valence and a level of activation (Barrett, 1998, 2006;
Searle, 2000). Searle’s theory of consciousness (Searle, 1992, 2004),
Edelman’s dynamic core theory (Edelman, 1987; Edelman and
Tononi, 2000) and Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (cf.
Damasio, 1999) all emphasize dynamic processes that encom-
pass both intentionality (e.g., appraisal, see Scherer, 2001; Smith
and Kirby, 2001) and affect (Russell and Barrett, 1999; Davidson,
2000). An emotional experience includes affect as one important
ingredient, but intentional psychological processes – perception,
cognition, attention, and behavior – are also necessary (Pessoa,
2008; Barrett, 2009b). To a great extent, the difference between an
emotion and a cognition depends on the level of attention paid to
the core affect (Russell, 2003).
Affect can be characterized as ﬂuctuating level of valence (plea-
sure/displeasure) and arousal (activation/deactivation; Wundt,
1897; Russell, 2003; Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009). It is the most
elementary consciously accessible sensation evident in moods and
emotions (Russell, 2003). Core affect is so called because it is
thought to arise in the core of the body or in neural represen-
tations of body state change (Russell and Barrett, 1999; Russell,
2003). It has been observed in subjective reports (Barrett, 2004),
in peripheral nervous system activation (Cacioppo et al., 2000),
and in facial and vocal expression (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Russell,
2003). The experience of core affect is thought to be present in
infants (Lewis, 2000) and psychologically universal (Russell, 1991;
Mesquita, 2003).
Intentional thought and affective experience are thought to
arise as dynamic aspects of spatially distinct dynamic processes,
integrated through synchrony of neural oscillations (Tononi and
Edelman, 1998; Searle, 2001; Seth et al., 2006). Let us attempt to
illustrate this idea, emphasizing dynamic over spatial aspects, by
integrating over neural location. The result is an average, summa-
rizing the activity of multiple brain areas, as shown in Figure 1.
The dynamic properties of this pattern are the critical features;
intentionality and affect correspond to dynamic aspects of the
integrated neural activity. In this illustration, affective aspects cor-
respond to changes in higher frequency activity, while intentional
FIGURE 1 | A conscious process is conceived as a dynamic pattern of
activity. Intentionality and affect are conceived as separable aspects of
such processes, and different types of communication sounds may convey
more of one or the other. Language primarily communicates intentionality;
it is “about” events in the external world. However, certain aspects of
speech, such as prosody, can communicate affect. Music, on the other
hand, communicates primarily affect; it is most often not “about” anything.
However, under certain circumstances music can signify events or elicit
memories.
aspects take place at lower frequencies, and appear as amplitude
modulations. This is only a visual aid of course; we do not know
enough to speculate about which frequency bands or dynamic
features might correspond to intentionality and affect. Here we
oversimplify to illustrate the point that relevant aspects of expe-
rience may correspond to dynamical aspects of integrated neural
processes. If this approach is on the right track, however, then this
way of thinking about core affect may lead to a better understand-
ing why music is such an especially effective means of affective
communication.
MUSICAL NEURODYNAMICS
At any givenmoment, a uniﬁedneurodynamic process is shaped by
exogenous sensory input such as sights or sounds, input from the
body such as vestibular sensations, endogenous constructs such
as autobiographical memories, and by communication sounds
such as music and speech. It seems likely that if intentionality
and affect are different dynamic aspects of these spatiotempo-
ral patterns, then different kinds of communication sounds may
couple into different aspects of the dynamics. Of course, it is
well established that different modes of auditory communication,
i.e., music and speech, convey more of one aspect or the other.
Speech primarily communicates intentionality; it is “about”events
in the external world. Nevertheless, certain aspects of speech,
such as prosody, directly communicate affect. Music, on the
other hand, communicates primarily affect; it is most often not
“about” anything. However music can signify objects or events,
and it can evoke memories and images. Thus, both types of
signals can induce emotions, although in different ways. What
we want to suggest is that music may couple directly into affec-
tive dynamics because it causes the brain to resonate in certain
ways.
Nonlinear oscillation and resonant responses to acoustic sig-
nals are found at multiple time scales in the nervous system, from
thousands of Hertz in the auditory nerve and brainstem, to cortical
oscillations in delta, theta, beta, and gamma ranges. The relative
timescales of these processes are illustrated in Figure 2. From
the earliest stages of the auditory system, volleys of action poten-
tials time-lock to dynamic features of acoustic waves (Joris et al.,
2004; Laudanski et al., 2010). Time-locked brainstem responses
are thought to be important in the perception of pitch, which
is observed from 30 Hz (Pressnitzer et al., 2001) up to about
4000 Hz (Plack and Oxenham, 2005). In auditory cortex, endoge-
nous cortical oscillations entrain to low frequency rhythms of
acoustic stimuli (Lakatos et al., 2008; Nozaradan et al., 2011). Cor-
tical entrainment is thought to be important in the perception of
rhythm, which extends from about 8 Hz (Repp, 2005a) to ultra
low cortical frequencies (Buzsáki, 2006; Large, 2008). Between
the timescales of pitch and rhythm lie the frequencies thought to
be important in binding neural processes into uniﬁed conscious
scenes (Engel and Singer, 2001; Seth et al., 2006; Fujioka et al.,
2012).
PITCH AND TONALITY
In central auditory circuits, action potentials phase- and mode-
lock to the ﬁne time structure and the temporal envelope modula-
tions of auditory stimuli at many different neural levels (Langner,
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FIGURE 2 |Timescales of neural dynamics and timescales of musical
communication. Music engages the brain on multiple timescales, from
fractions of one cycle per second (left) to thousands of cycles per second
(right). At rhythmic timescales, cortical oscillations entrain to rhythmic
stimuli. At tonal timescales, volleys of action potentials time lock to
acoustic waves.
1992; Large et al., 1998; Joris et al., 2004; Laudanski et al., 2010).
Neural synchrony is thought to be important in pitch percep-
tion (Cariani and Delgutte, 1996; Hartmann, 1996), consonance
(Ebeling, 2008; Shapira Lots and Stone, 2008), and musical tonal-
ity (Tramo et al., 2001; Large, 2010a). While phase-locking is
well established, mode-locked spiking patterns have recently been
reported in the mammalian auditory system (Laudanski et al.,
2010) and may explain the highly nonlinear responses to musical
intervals that can be measured in the human auditory brainstem
response (Lee et al., 2009; Large and Almonte, 2012; Lerud et al.,
2013).
Mode-locking implies binding between neural frequencies
that display particular frequency relationships (Hoppensteadt
and Izhikevich, 1997). In this form of synchrony a periodic
stimulus interacts with intrinsic neural dynamics causing m
cycles of the oscillation to lock to k cycles of the stimulus.
Mode-locking leads to neural resonance at harmonics (k∗f1),
subharmonics (f1/m), summation frequencies (e.g., f1 + f2),
difference frequencies (e.g., f2 − f1), and integer ratios (e.g.,
k∗f1/m)2. This implies feature binding based on harmonic-
ity (Bregman, 1990), and suggests a role for mode-locking in
the perception of pitch (cf. Cartwright et al., 1999). This also
predicts a signiﬁcant cross-cultural musical invariant (Burns,
1999) because octave frequency relationships (2:1 and 1:2) are
the most stable, followed by ﬁfths (3:2), and fourths (4:3).
Mode-lockingmay provide a neurodynamic explanation formusi-
cal consonance and dissonance (Shapira Lots and Stone, 2008)
that does not depend on interference (e.g., Plomp and Levelt,
1965).
Perhaps most relevant to the current discussion is the issue
of scale degree qualia (Huron, 2006), which has important
implications for understanding musical expectancy (Meyer, 1956;
Zuckerkandl, 1956). Scale degree qualia differentiate musi-
cal sound sequences from arbitrary sound sequences, and
are thought to enable non-referential sound patterns to carry
meaning. Most discussions of expectancy and emotion assume
scale degree qualia to be learned based on the statistics of
2f1 and f2 denote frequencies of pure tones and k and m are positive integers.
tonal sequences (e.g., Meyer, 1956; Krumhansl and Kessler,
1982; Lerdahl, 2001; Huron, 2006), and therefore culture-
dependent. However, recent dynamical analyses have shown
that mode-locking provides a better explanation for quantita-
tive measurements of stability in both Western and North Indian
tonal systems (Krumhansl and Kessler, 1982; Castellano et al.,
1984; Large, 2010a; Large and Almonte, 2011). Thus, scale
degree qualia likely depend on the interaction of the stimulus
sequence with intrinsic neurodynamic properties of the physical
brain.
RHYTHM AND METER
At the timescale of rhythm and meter, relationships between
musical and neural rhythms are equally striking (Musacchia
et al., 2013). In auditory cortex, brain rhythms nest hierar-
chically, for example delta phase modulates theta amplitude,
and theta phase modulates gamma amplitude (Lakatos et al.,
2005). Like neural rhythms, music rhythms nest hierarchi-
cally, such that faster metrical frequencies subdivide the pulse
(London, 2004). Pulse perception provides a good match for
the delta band (0.5–4 Hz, see London, 2004) while fast met-
rical frequencies occupy theta (4–8 Hz, see e.g., Repp, 2005b;
Large, 2008). Importantly, acoustic stimulation in the pulse
range synchronizes auditory cortical rhythms in the delta-band
(Will and Berg, 2007; Stefanics et al., 2010; Nozaradan et al.,
2011) and modulates the amplitude of higher frequency beta
and gamma rhythms (Snyder and Large, 2005; Iversen et al.,
2006; Fujioka et al., 2012). Models of synchronization to acous-
tic rhythms (see e.g., Large, 2008) have successfully predicted a
wide range of behavioral observations in time perception (Jones,
1990; McAuley, 1995), meter perception (Lerge and Kolen, 1994;
Large, 2000), attention allocation (Large and Jones, 1999; Stefan-
ics et al., 2010), and motor coordination (Kelso et al., 1990; Repp,
2005c). Moreover, musical qualia including metrical expectancy
(Huron, 2005), syncopation (London, 2004), and groove (Tomic
and Janata, 2008; Janata et al., 2012), have all been linked to
synchronization of cortical rhythms and/or bodily movements.
In addition, synchronization of rhythmic movements to music
(Burger et al., 2013) and synchronization between individuals
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(e.g., Hove and Risen, 2009) have been linked to affective
responses.
The perception of rhythm also provides an example of syn-
chronous time-locked patterns of activity integrating the function
of multiple brain regions. When people listen to musical rhythms
that have a pulse or basic beat,multiple brain regions are activated,
including auditory cortices, cerebellum, basal ganglia, premotor
cortex, and the supplementary motor cortex (Zatorre et al., 2007;
Chen et al., 2008; Grahn and Rowe, 2009). In these areas, the
amplitude of beta band activity waxes and wanes with the pulse
of the acoustic stimulation (Snyder and Large, 2005; Iversen et al.,
2006; Fujioka et al., 2012). The speciﬁc neural structures involved
depend on the tempo of the stimulus, and it appears that the syn-
chrony of beta band processes is what binds the neural activity
(Fujioka et al., 2012). This suggests that perhaps it is not the areas
per se, but the integrated neural activity that corresponds to the
experience of pulse.
MUSICAL COMMUNICATION AS NEURODYNAMIC
RESONANCE
We can summarize the above discussion by saying that music
taps into brain dynamics at the right time scales to cause both
brain and body to resonate to the patterns. This causes the
formation of spatiotemporal patterns of activity on multiple
temporal and spatial scaleswithin the nervous system. Thedynam-
ical characteristics of such spatiotemporal patterns – oscillations,
bifurcations, stability, attraction, and responses to perturba-
tions – predict perceptual, attentional, and behavioral responses
to music, as well as musical qualia including tonal and rhythmic
expectations. Conceptualization of consciousness in similar neu-
rodynamic terms leads to a new way to think about how music
may communicate affective content. Neurodynamic responses
that give rise to musical qualia also resonate with affective cir-
cuits, enabling music to directly engage the sorts of feelings
that are associated with emotional experiences. In this section
we ask, how might affective resonance take place, do musical
qualia arise from intrinsic neurodynamics, and what exactly is
communicated?
AFFECTIVE RESONANCE
We begin with an example of affective resonance to rhythm.
Expressive piano performance is a kind of social interaction in
which correlatedﬂuctuations in timing and intensity transfer emo-
tional information from the performer to the listener (Bhatara
et al., 2010). Expressive tempo ﬂuctuations display 1/f structure
(Rankin et al., 2009; Hennig et al., 2011), and listeners predict
such tempo changes when entraining to musical performances
(Rankin et al., 2009; Rankin, 2010). A recent study compared
BOLD responses to an expressive performance and a mechanical
performance, in which the piece was “performed” by computer,
with no ﬂuctuations in timing and intensity. Greater activations
were found in emotion and reward related areas for the expressive
performance, consistent with transfer of affective information.
Tempo ﬂuctuations, BOLD activations and real-time ratings of
valence and arousal were also compared for the expressive perfor-
mance. Over the 3–1/2 min performance, ﬂuctuations in timing
correlated with BOLD changes in motor networks known to be
involved in rhythmic entrainment, and in a network consistent
with the human “mirror neuron” system (Chapin et al., 2010). As
tempo increased, activation in these regions increased. Tempo
ﬂuctuations also correlated with real-time reports of affective
arousal.
Despite the fact that the tempo-correlated activations were
observed in so-called mirror neuron areas, this was not motor
mirroring; half the participants were not musicians, and none
were familiar with the piece. Could listener responses arise
from a more general form of contagion in which the percep-
tion of affective expression directly induces the same emotion in
the perceiver (Carr et al., 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006)? Based on what is known
about neural responses to rhythm (Nozaradan et al., 2011; Fujioka
et al., 2012), we propose a simple, if somewhat speculative,
interpretation. Activation in mirror regions reﬂects resonance
of endogenous cortical rhythms to exogenous musical rhythms.
Activation increases as tempo increases because, as this neural
circuit entrains to the musical rhythm it tracks the tempo (i.e.,
frequency modulations) of the performance (Herrmann et al.,
2013). The frequency modulations themselves would represent
violations of temporal expectancy (Large and Jones, 1999). The
expressive performance also led to emotion and reward related
neural activations (when compared with a mechanical perfor-
mance that precisely controlled for melody, harmony, and rhythm,
see Chapin et al., 2010). We hypothesize that the frequency mod-
ulation of mirror regions led to these activations (Molnar-Szakacs
and Overy, 2006; Chapin et al., 2010). Thus, perhaps music
directly couples into affective circuitry by exploiting resonant
modes of cortical function, thereby creating the basis for affective
communication
INTRINSIC DYNAMICS, MUSICAL QUALIA AND COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT
The preceding discussion suggests that at least some aspects of
affective responses to music are deeply rooted in the intrinsic
physics of the brain and body. If this is true, then neurodynamic
investigationsmay ultimately explain howmusical rhythms couple
into neural circuits and modulate affective responses. But, could
the neurodynamic approach explain musical qualia more gen-
erally? Consider the fundamental qualitative difference between
pitch and rhythm. A simple acoustic click, repeated at 5 ms inter-
vals, generates a pitch percept at 200 Hz. Increase the interval
to 500 ms and the percept is that of a series of discrete events,
with a pulse rate of 2 Hz. From a dynamical systems point of
view, it makes perfect sense that the neural mechanisms brought
to bear on the two stimuli may be similar; the difference is merely
one of timescale. Yet from a phenomenological point of view,
the two are fundamentally different: a single continuous event
versus a rhythmic sequence. Why the difference in qualia? Per-
haps it is because the timescale at which distinct neural events are
bound together into uniﬁed conscious scenes lie between these
timescales of pitch and rhythm. Perhaps the difference in qualia
lies in the timescale relationship, not in the mechanism per se. If
so, perhaps neural oscillation explains not only rhythm related
responses, but also pitch related responses, such as stability and
attraction.
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We have argued elsewhere that the terms stability and attrac-
tion, used by theorists to describe scale degree qualia (Meyer, 1956;
Zuckerkandl, 1956; Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983; Lerdahl, 2001),
are not metaphorical. These refer to real, dynamical stability and
attraction relationships in a neural ﬁeld stimulated by external
frequencies (Large, 2010a; Large and Almonte, 2011). In other
words, scale degree qualia are simply what it feels like when our
brains resonate to tonal sequences. This approach can explain
the perception of tonal stability and attraction in Western modes
(Krumhansl and Kessler, 1982; Large, 2010a), and North Indian
raga (Castellano et al., 1984; Large andAlmonte, 2011). It may also
shed light on the development of statistical regularities in tonal
melodies, implying that certain pitches occur more frequently
because they have greater dynamical stability in underlying neural
networks.
There is now a great deal of evidence regarding development
of basic music structure cognition, including meter (Hannon
and Trehub, 2005; Kirschner and Tomasello, 2009; Winkler et al.,
2009) and tonality (Trainor and Trehub, 1992; Schellenberg and
Trehub, 1996; Trehub et al., 1999). Such results reveal develop-
mental trajectories that occur over the ﬁrst several years of life,
as well as perceptual invariants that are consistent with intrin-
sic neurodynamics (Large, 2010b) tuned with Hebbian plasticity
(Hoppensteadt and Izhikevich, 1996; Large, 2010a). Dalla Bella
et al. (2001) asked if children can determine whether music is
happy or sad. 3- to 4-year-olds failed to distinguish happy from
sad above chance, 5-year-olds” responses were affected by tempo,
while 6- to 8-year-old children used both tempo and mode. Thus,
children begin to use tempo at about the same time the ability
to synchronize movements emerges, and they begin to use mode
at about the same time that sensitivity to key emerges (Trainor
and Trehub, 1992; Schellenberg and Trehub, 1999; McAuley et al.,
2006). The fact that the development of the two main musical
dimensions – rhythm and tonality – have the same time course as
their affective correlates, strongly suggests a link between thedevel-
opment of neurodynamic responses and music-induced affective
experience.
We do not claim that musical qualia are hard-wired, however,
our argument does suggest that substantive aspects of musical
expectancy and musical contagion may be explainable directly in
neurodynamic terms, linking “high-level” perception with “low-
level” neurodynamics. In combination with Hebbian plasticity,
intrinsic neurodynamic constraints could explain the sensitivity
of infant listeners to musical invariants, as well as the ability to
acquire sophisticated musical knowledge. Moreover, this expla-
nation suggests that association of affective responses with the
musical modes of diverse cultures may not be due entirely to con-
vention, as has been speculated previously (Meyer, 1956; Huron,
2005). Indeed cross-cultural studies in the perception of Western
music suggest that happiness and sadness are communicated, at
least in part, based onmode (Balkwill et al., 2004; Fritz et al., 2009).
Moreover, unencultured Western listeners may be able to under-
stand the moods intended by Indian raga performances (Balkwill
and Thompson, 1999; Chordia and Rae, 2008). At the very least,
these cross-cultural ﬁndings suggest that associations of mood
with mode have been prematurely dismissed as conventional, and
these relationships deserve to be reevaluated.
WHAT IS COMMUNICATED – BASIC EMOTION OR CORE AFFECT?
Juslin andVastfjall (2008) propose that emotional contagion oper-
ates similarly to facial expression of basic emotions (Juslin and
Laukka, 2003; Laird and Strout, 2007). However, because the
theory of basic emotions has recently been called into question,
it makes sense to review the body of evidence that pertains to
music. In communication studies, both performances and lis-
tener judgments of intended emotion have been linked to speciﬁc
musical features, including tempo, articulation, intensity, and
timbre (Gabrielsson and Juslin, 1996; Peretz et al., 1998; Juslin,
2000; Juslin and Laukka, 2003). However, these studies also
show that, at least for Western music, happiness and sadness are
the most reliably communicated emotions (Kreutz et al., 2002;
Lindström et al., 2002; Kallinen, 2005; Kreutz et al., 2008; Mohn
et al., 2011), while other “basic” emotions are more often con-
fused (Gabrielsson and Juslin, 1996; Peretz et al., 1998; Juslin,
2000; Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Kreutz et al., 2008; Mohn et al.,
2011). Interestingly, Ekman (1993) and Izard et al. (2000) have
both questioned the theory of facial expression of basic emo-
tion based on variability and confusability. Moreover, analyses of
physiological responses to music show that while musical stimuli
elicit signiﬁcant responses, physiological measures do not gener-
ally match listener self-reports using emotion terms (Krumhansl,
1997).
Basic emotion theory has been linked to an approach in which
music is supposed to somehow imitate or mimic more biologi-
cally relevant stimuli, such as speech or mother-infant interactions
(Juslin and Laukka, 2003), leading to the direct perception of
emotion. Such discussions generally assume that musical commu-
nication is not evolutionarily selected, but needs to piggyback on
more fundamentalmechanisms. Our proposal is thatmusic speaks
to the brain in its own language, it need not imitate any other form
of communication. In this sense, other forms of communication
may be seen to induce or modulate emotions more indirectly, i.e.,
the effect is more cognitive (cf. Langer, 1951). Thus, the study of
music may provide a unique window into the fundamental nature
of affective communication, which might explain, for example,
why music has the ability to evoke emotional memories (Janata
et al., 2007).
It is tempting to try to unify core affect with basic emotion
(Juslin, 2001) by assuming that each emotion category is asso-
ciated with a speciﬁc core affective state (e.g., fear is unpleasant
and highly arousing, sadness is unpleasant and less arousing, etc.).
However, the mapping of emotion to affect is not unique; core
affective states experienced during two different episodes of a
given, nameable emotion (e.g., fear) typically differ depending on
the situation (Meyer, 1956; Barrett, 2009b; Wilson-Mendenhall
et al., 2013). Moreover, musical variables such as melodic con-
tour, tempo, loudness, texture, and timbral sharpness, predict
real-time listener ratings of arousal and valence well (Schubert,
1999, 2001, 2004), and correlate with BOLD responses in a num-
ber of brain regions (Chapin et al., 2010). Neuroimaging studies
have also revealed BOLD responses to parametric manipulation
of pleasantness (Blood et al., 1999; Koelsch et al., 2006), and these
overlap with responses to intensely pleasurable music (Blood and
Zatorre, 2001; Salimpoor et al., 2010).
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CONCLUSION
In summary, we believe that a coherent picture is developing,
based on recent ﬁndings of nonlinear resonant responses to acous-
tic stimulation at multiple timescales (Ruggero, 1992; Joris et al.,
2004; Lakatos et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009; Laudanski et al., 2010;
Nozaradan et al., 2011) and theoretical analyses that show how
such processes could underlie complex cognitive computations as
well as phenomenal and affective aspects of our musical experi-
ences (Baldi and Meir, 1990; Hoppensteadt and Izhikevich, 1997;
Izhikevich, 2002; Shapira Lots and Stone, 2008; Large, 2010b).
Such results and analyses suggest that neurodynamics provides an
appropriate level at which to understand not only perceptual and
cognitive responses to music, but ultimately affective and emo-
tional responses as well. We suggest that, to support affective
communication, music need not mimic some other type of social
interaction; it need only engage the nervous system at the appro-
priate timescales. Indeed, music may be a unique type of stimulus
that engages the brain in ways that no other stimulus can.
Thus, we suggest that there is something special about the
way music communicates emotion. Our approach recasts musi-
cal expectancy and affective contagion as nonlinear resonance
to musical patterns. Resonance occurs simultaneously on mul-
tiple timescales, leading to stable or metastable patterns of
neural responses. Such patterns are inherently spatiotemporal,
however, temporal aspects of the stimulus determine at any
speciﬁc point which neural structures are involved. Violations
of expectancy, such as the occurrence of a strong rhythmic
event on a weak beat (a syncopation) or the prolongation of
an unstable tone where a stable tone is expected (an appog-
giatura), would correspond to a disruptions, or perturbations
of the ongoing pattern. Implication and realization would cor-
respond to relaxation toward, and reestablishment of a stable
orbit. Stable and unstable in this context, are determined by
the intrinsic neurodynamics of brain networks involved, which
depend, in part, on tuning of the dynamics via synaptic plas-
ticity. In this way, music may modulate affective neurodynamics
directly by coupling into those aspects of the dynamic core of con-
sciousness that govern our subjective feelings from moment to
moment.
GLOSSARY
Affect/Core affect: The most elementary consciously accessible
sensation evident in moods and emotions. Affect can be char-
acterized as ﬂuctuating level of valence (pleasure/displeasure) and
arousal (activation/ deactivation; Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009).
Core affect is so called because it is thought to arise in the core of
the body or in neural representations of body state change (Russell,
2003).
Basic emotions: A few privileged emotion kinds (e.g., anger, sad-
ness, fear, and happiness), each of which is thought to derive
from an evolutionarily preserved brain module. Basic emotions
are discrete, and each category shares a distinctive collection
of properties, including patterns of autonomic nervous system
activity, behavioral responses, and action tendencies. A set of
emotion-speciﬁc brain structures is thought to mediate these par-
ticular “basic” emotions (Allport, 1924; Izard, 1971; Ekman, 1972;
Panksepp, 1998).
Dynamic core: Functional clusters of neuronal groups in the
thalamocortical system that are hypothesized to underlie con-
sciousness. Distinct neuronal groups contribute to the contents
of consciousness through enhanced synchrony of neural rhythms.
The boundaries of this core are suggested to shift over time, with
transitions occurring under the inﬂuence of internal and external
stimulation (Seth, 2007).
Empathy: A feeling that arises when the perception of an emo-
tional gesture in another person directly induces the same emotion
in the perceiver without any appraisal process (see Juslin and
Vastfjall, 2008).
Emotional contagion/Affective contagion: A process that occurs
between individuals in which emotional or affective information
is transferred from one individual to another. The idea that people
may“catch” the emotions of others when seeing their facial expres-
sions, hearing their vocal expressions, or hearing their musical
performances (see Juslin and Vastfjall, 2008)
Emotion: Affective responses to situations that usually involve
a number of sub-components – subjective feeling, physiologi-
cal arousal, thought, expression, action tendency, and regula-
tion – which are more or less synchronized (Juslin and Vastfjall,
2008). Emotions are intentional; they are about an object or
event.
Feelings: The subjective phenomenal character of an experience,
used informally to refer to qualia or affect.
Intentionality: The power of minds to be about, to represent, or
to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs (Jacob, 2010).
Psychological constructionism: The theory that emotions results
from the combination of psychologically primitive processes,
which encompass both affective and intentional components. A
speciﬁc emotion is not the invariable result of activation in a par-
ticular brain area; neural circuitry realizes more basic processes
across emotion categories. Psychological constructionists argue
that emotions are culturally relative and learned (see Russell and
Barrett, 1999; Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Barrett, 2009a,b).
Qualia/musical qualia: The distinctive subjective character of a
mental state; what it is like to experience each state; the intro-
spectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives (Tye,
2013). Musical qualia refers to the subjective character of spe-
ciﬁc musical events, experienced within a tonal and/or temporal
context.
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